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Class actions are a useful means for achieving economies of
scale in litigation, facilitating the prosecution of claims that would be
uneconomic to litigate individually, and strengthening enforcement of
the laws. These advantages can be obtained only because the class
action brings before the court the claims of absent parties - people
who may not even know that their rights are being determined in
absentia. Because class action judgments are entitled to res judicata
effect, the procedure can foreclose significant rights of parties who do
not wish to release their claims or who may not even wish for the
litigation to occur at all. The problem is particularly acute in the case
of damages class actions under Rule 23(b)(3), a procedure that allows
for forced consolidation of individual claims that, aside from practical
considerations, could theoretically be litigated individually without
impacting the interests of other claimants. This tension between the
advantages and disadvantages of adjudicating the rights of absent
parties is a pervasive theme in class action law.
The framers of the current Rule 23, adopted in 1966 and
revised from time to time thereafter, understood this tension and
included measures designed to ameliorate it. The commonality,
typicality, and adequacy-of-representation requirements of Rule 23(a)
work to ensure both that the interests of absent class members are
effectively served by competent and loyal counsel and that the
representative plaintiff is not disabled from properly performing his or
her role. Settlements of class actions must be reviewed by the court
and found to be fair, adequate, and reasonable to the class.' Notice of
any settlement must be distributed to the class under court
supervision. 2 As to (b)(3) class actions, in which the problem of absent
parties is most acute, the rules also require that the class members
receive the best notice of class certification practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. 3
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
2. Id.
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
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Perhaps the most innovative requirement under the current
Rule 23 - one not present under the pre-1966 iteration of the rules - is
a provision allowing class members to exclude themselves from the
class in a (b)(3) case.4 Over time, this procedure, commonly known as
an "opt-out," has developed into a fundamental part of class action
practice. 5 Indeed, the right to opt-out provides a key premise for many
of the basic principles that shape the (b)(3) action-jurisdiction over
absent parties, due process considerations, judicial review of
settlements, awards of attorneys' fees, and more.
In addition to the right to opt-out of a (b)(3) action, members of
any class action-even "mandatory" actions under Rule 23(b)(1) or
23(b)(2)--have the option to exercise their collective "voice" by
objecting to a proposed settlement.6 In theory, the right to object to a
settlement provides a check on reasonableness: the court can look to
the views of class members as a counterweight to the views of counsel
and the representative parties, who may be biased in favor of
approval.
But how important are opt-outs and objections in the real world
of class action litigation? How frequently do class members opt-out of
class actions, and in what types of cases? How prevalent are
objections? Knowledge of average opt-out and objection rates provides
background information for a court evaluating how the class has
reacted to a proposed settlement. Otherwise, a court has no basis for
evaluating how the observed opt-out or objection rates in a case at bar
compare with rates of opt-outs and objections in other cases.
Opt-out or objection rates provide even more fundamental
information about class actions. If class members only rarely object or
opt-out, we might infer that in many cases the right to opt-out or
object is not very meaningful for class members. This fact would seem
to somewhat undermine the value of these rights, as well as the
functions allocated to them under existing law. For example, the
difference between an opt-out class action and a mandatory class
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
5. See George Rutherglen, Future Claims in Mass Tort Cases: Deterrence, Compensation,
and Necessity, 88 VA. L. REV. 1989, 1995 (2002) ("The right to notice and to opt out has remained
at the center of class action litigation for the last three decades.")
6. On the analogy between settlement objections and the exercise of voice in political
contexts, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLuM. L. REV. 370, 377 (2000) ("[Olne could rely more
on voice by giving class members greater authority to hire or fire the class's attorney (or to
approve the settlement)"). For an evaluation of "whether objectors to class action settlements
add to the efficiency and fairness problems that plague modern class actions," see, for example,
Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 403 (2003).
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action-while so prominent in theoretical discussions-might prove to
be of only marginal practical importance. Similarly, the case for
assuming personal jurisdiction over absent class members in a (b)(3)
class could be significantly weakened if class members hardly ever
opt-out of such lawsuits.
The present study is the first systematic attempt to measure
the importance of opt-out rights and objections, as well as to assess
the determinants of when class members are likely to utilize them.7
We examined several thousand class action decisions for the eleven-
year period between 1993 and 2003 to collect data on the frequency of
opt-outs and objections. The study generated 236 cases in which we
could ascertain quantitative information about the number of
objectors, 159 cases with quantitative information about the number
of opt-outs, 205 cases with both the size of the class and the number of
objectors, and 143 cases with both the size of the class and the number
of opt-outs. 8 The cases with information about objectors and opt-outs
are not mutually exclusive. Many cases contained useful information
about both. Based on these samples, and subject to their limitations -
especially the limitation generated by relying exclusively on published
opinions-we find the following:
1. Opt-outs from class participation and objections to class
action resolutions are rare: on average, less than 1 percent of class
members opt-out and about 1 percent of class members object to class-
wide settlements.
2. Opt-out rates vary by case type. Even in case categories in
which the opt-out rates are highest, however, the percentage of class
members who exclude themselves is quite low. The highest mean opt-
out rate is 4.6 percent for the four mass tort cases for which data were
available. Employment discrimination cases rank second with an opt-
out rate of 2.2 percent for the three cases in our sample with the
necessary data. The opt-out rate for thirty-nine consumer class action
cases is less than 0.2 percent.
3. Like the rate of opt-outs, the rate of objections varies
depending on the type of case. Civil rights and employment
discrimination cases have (relatively speaking) high objector rates,
7. We will sometimes refer to opting out and objecting collectively as "dissenting activity."
8. In general, the published opinions provide opt-out statistics in settlement classes, when
class members have the choice between the benefits of a negotiated settlement or exclusion and
seeking an alternative remedy. Simply because courts do not report it, we do not have much
information on opt-outs in the setting contemplated by the framers of Rule 23: cases where notice
is distributed early in the litigation and class members then opt-out prior to any negotiated
settlement. We are confident, however, that if such cases were included in our data set, the
results would be even more pronounced: class members overwhelmingly do nothing when
provided the option to opt out of class actions.
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though their average rates are both less than 5 percent. Securities
and antitrust cases have lower objection rates. Consumer cases tend
to have the lowest objection rates of any case type with more than ten
cases in our sample.
4. Opt-out-rates and objector rates can be partly explained by
observable factors in a particular case. But the uniformly low rate of
opting-out makes it difficult to model the opt-out decision. Aside from
variation across case types, the most significant factor explaining opt-
out and objector rates is the recovery per class member: as would be
expected by theory, opt-out and objector rates increase as per capita
recovery increases. This finding suggests that the economics of
obtaining individual counsel help drive the dissent rates.
5. We do not find robust evidence that the rate of opt-out or
objection is statistically associated with the level of attorney fee or the
fee's proportion of the client's recovery. Class dissent does not appear
to increase when the fee is high, nor does dissent appear to exert a
notable moderating effect on fees. The class's recovery is the
overwhelmingly dominant feature in shaping the fee level.
6. As predicted by theory, rates of dissent decline as the
number of class members increases.
7. As also predicted by theory, the rate of objection to a
settlement is negatively correlated with the likelihood that the
settlement will be approved. However, we find no evidence that the
opt-out rate has any effect on settlement approval.
8. Interestingly, overall levels of dissent to class action
settlements declined during the period of this study. Although dissent
rates have never been high, they exhibit a noticeable decline between
1993 and 2003.
The overall impression across the range of cases in the study is
that opt-outs and objections are extremely uncommon. This evidence
supports the claim, often found in the literature, that class counsel
controls the litigation.9  This conclusion is not necessarily an
9. The dominating role of class counsel is stressed in John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 877, 896-900 (1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Though Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677-78 (1986); Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions:
Diminished Protection for the Class and the Case for Reform, 73 NEB. L. REV. 646, 659-63 (1994);
Alon Klement, Who Should Guard The Guardians? A New Approach For Monitoring Class Action
Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 27-28 (2002);- Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 41-44 (1991). Securities fraud litigation
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78) ("PSLRA") may present a somewhat different
2004] 1533
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
indictment of current class action practice. But our findings do have
implications for courts assessing class action settlement proposals in
light of a seemingly low absolute number or percentage of class
members opting-out or objecting. Nominally low opt-out or objection
rates should be evaluated in light of the rates in the mass of cases.
Since this Article shows those rates to be trivially small in most cases,
courts should be marginally less inclined to credit low rates of class
dissent as evidence that the settlement receives the affirmative
endorsement of a class. Both courts and theoreticians may also need
to rethink the substantial role that opt-out rights play in the theory of
modern class action litigation. Too much weight may be currently
placed on a procedural option that only rarely serves its intended
functions.
Part I of this Article discusses the importance of opt-out rights
to the theory and practice of class action litigation; Part II describes
our empirical study; Part III reports the key results; and Part IV
discusses the implications of the results.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF OPT-OUT RIGHTS
Opt-out rights play a central role both in the theoretical
foundations of class action law and in day-to-day judicial application
of class action principles. Courts and commentators regularly rely on
opt-out rights to support the functioning of the current class action
system.
A. Opt-out Rights' Central Role in Class Action Adjudication
Courts recognize that class actions bind parties who are not
central participants in their own litigation and thus raise due process
concerns. Opt-out rights are a central component of the argument for
why (b)(3) class actions satisfy procedural due process requirements,
even though absent class members are represented by attorneys they
did not select and may have never met.
1. Opt-out Rights, Objectors, and Due Process
The right to opt-out provides part of the justification for
bringing into a state court parties with damages claims over whom the
court would otherwise have no personal jurisdiction. The
idea--suggested by the Supreme Court in the Shutts case--is that




when a class member receives notice of the action and fails to opt-out,
he or she can be said to have submitted themselves, at least implicitly,
to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.10
Opt-out rights are also intertwined with the due process
concerns associated with binding absent class members (for example,
members of the class who have not personally appeared in the action)
by any final judgment or approved settlement of the litigation.11
When opt-out rights are conferred, the courts will bind class members
to the judgment if they fail to exercise their privilege to exclude
themselves from the class.' 2 Conversely, if opt-out rights are not
provided in a suit in which a substantial element is a claim for money
damages, the court may conclude that the proposed litigation would
violate class members' due process rights. 13 In the case of settlement
classes, where class members have the ability to observe the terms of
a proposed settlement before deciding whether to exclude themselves,
opt-out rights may alleviate due process concerns about expansive
releases in a settlement agreement, 14 whereas the absence of opt-out
rights may exacerbate such concerns.
In some cases, concerns for fairness to absent class members
spark the creation of "super" opt-out rights transcending the rights
explicitly conferred by Rule 23(b)(3). For example, some settlements
of (b)(3) class actions allow class members to exclude themselves from
the action even after the settlement is approved. 15 Super opt-out
rights are explicitly authorized under the recent amendments to Rule
10. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812-14 (1985). The jurisdictional basis
for Shutts may not be present when the class action may result in the imposition of liability on
the absent plaintiff (for example, an obligation to pay counsel fees) as opposed to the potential
loss of a chose in action. See State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1006-08 (Vt. 2003).
11. The opt-out in a case brought in state court is significant in light of the ruling of the
United States Supreme Court in Matsushita Electrical Industrial Company v. Epstein, 516 U.S.
367, 380 (1996), which held that a state court class action settlement can release claims within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
12. See, e.g., Demint v. NationsBank Corp., 208 F.R.D. 639, 643-44 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
13. See, e.g., Molski v. Gleich, 307 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2002); Westways World Travel,
Inc. v. AMR Corp., 218 F.R.D. 223, 241 (C.D. Cal. 2003); In re Nat. Life Ins. Co., 247 F. Supp. 2d
486 (D. Vt. 2002); Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. granted in
part by Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 510 U.S. 810 (1993), and cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted by Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994); In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc.,
221 F.3d 870, 881 (6th Cir. 2000).
14. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61 (2d Cir, 1982); O'Brien v. Nat'l. Prop.
Analysts Partners, 739 F. Supp. 896, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re NASDAQ Market-Makers
Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 465, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The fact that the scope of the release has
been fully disclosed in the Class Notice with opportunity for opting out strongly supports the
scope of the releases.").
15. The Fen-Phen settlement in involving American Home Products is an example. See In
re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Products Liab. Litig., 2003 WL
22657123, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2003) (referring to the exercise of "back-end" opt-out).
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23, which allow the trial judge to refuse to approve a settlement of a
(b)(3) class action unless it affords a second opt-out right to class
members who did not request exclusion in the first go-round.'
6
Some courts have approved a different form of super opt-out
rights by ordering that class members be allowed to exclude
themselves from (b)(1) or (b)(2) actions, notwithstanding the
ostensibly mandatory nature of these procedures, 17 even when the opt-
out right is sought by an absent class member rather than by the class
representative or lead class counsel.' 8 Similarly, some courts have
viewed the absence of opt-out rights in mandatory classes as a reason
for imposing a nonstatutory requirement of "coherence" that emulates
the predominance and superiority requirements explicitly set forth in
Rule 23(b)(3).19
Due process-based concerns also appear to underlie the right of
class members to object to proposed settlements. 20 Such concerns are
especially pronounced in the case of "mandatory" class actions under
Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2), which do not explicitly confer opt-out
rights. Lacking the ability to opt-out, members of these classes are
allowed to protect their interests, at least to some extent, by being
allowed to articulate objections to any proposed resolution of the
controversy.
2. Opt-out Rights as a Check on Class Counsel and Class
Representative Performance
The rights of class members to opt-out and object may be seen
as a market check on the propensity of counsel to serve their own
interests over those of the class. If bad representation triggers opt-
outs and objections, counsel will make an effort to provide good
representation ex ante in order to prevent their deficiencies from being
brought to the attention of the court ex post. Similarly, courts may
conclude that the presence of opt-out rights reduces the need for
intensive scrutiny of the adequacy of either the class counsel 2' or the
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3).
17. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999); Brown v.
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992); Holmes v. Cont'l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144,
1160 (iith Cir. 1983); Fisher v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 217 F.R.D. 201, 214 (E.D. Va. 2003);
Palmer v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 217 F.R.D. 430, 439-40 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
18. See, e.g., Doe v. Karadzic, 182 F.R.D. 424, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying request to opt-
out).
19. See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1114 (1999).
20. See, e.g., Kincade v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1981).
21. See, e.g., Abby v. City of Detroit, 218 F.R.D. 544, 548 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
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class representative, 22 on the theory that if class members are
dissatisfied with their representation, they can exclude themselves.
23
Conversely, if class members are not afforded the right to opt-out, this
may result in a more stringent application of the adequacy of
representation requirement.
24
Courts frequently look to the number of opt-outs or objections
as bearing on both the fairness of the settlement and the appropriate
fee to be awarded to counsel. Thus, statistics on opt-outs and
objections have become important data for courts in determining
whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. The idea is
that if few class members exclude themselves after reviewing the
terms of a proposed settlement, this tends to be a vote of confidence in
the settlement by the parties most affected. Similarly, courts may
view a small number of exclusions as indicative of excellent results
warranting higher-than-usual compensation for class counsel. 25 Even
the presence of opt-out rights, without regard to actual usage, may
influence a court to resolve doubts in favor of the reasonableness of a
proposed settlement. 26 On the other hand, when opt-out rights are not
provided, their absence is sometimes viewed as a serious drawback to
a settlement. 27
3. Opt-out Rights Shape the Practice of Class Action Law
The presence or absence of opt-out rights affects the practice of
class action law in numerous ways. The possibility of mass opt-outs
orchestrated by dissident class counsel can pose a threat to a
negotiated class action settlement. Competing class counsel
22. See, e.g., Jones v. Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., No. 02 C 9392, 2003 WL 21654365, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2003).
23. See, e.g., Carder Buick-Olds Co. v. Reynolds & Reynolds, Inc., 775 N.E.2d 531, 535 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2002).
24. See, e.g., ARC of Washington State, Inc. v. Quasim, No. C99-5577FDB, 2001 WL
1448523, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2001) (noting that "[tihe importance of adequate
representation is only heightened when, as here, the members of the proposed class have no
right to opt-out").
25. See, e.g., Deloach v. Philip Morris Co., No. 1:00CV01235, 2003 WL 23094907, at *10
(M.D. N.C. Dec. 19, 2003) ("[T]he fact that [sic] there were not objections to the settlement and
only 161 timely opt-outs testifies to the value of the settlement in the eyes of the class.").
26. See, e.g., Petruzzi's, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 983 F. Supp. 595, 610 (M.D. Pa. 1996)
(viewing the settlement opt-out right as making presence of coupon relief less troublesome).
27. The "mandatory" nature of the settlement was one of the rationales underlying the
Supreme Court's rejection of a global asbestos settlement in Ortiz litigation. See Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842-43 (1999) (adopting a limiting construction of the Rule
23(b)(1)(B) mandatory class in order to avoid "serious constitutional concerns raised by the
mandatory class resolution of individual legal claims").
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sometimes even attempt to exclude entire subclasses. 28 To deter
secession by a segment of the class, some settlements are conditioned
on fewer than some critical mass of class members opting out.29 Other
settlements contain provisions that appear designed to make opting
out appear less attractive. 30  Courts also police against opt-out
campaigns by competing counsel.
31
Opt-out rights provide the most important rationale for
requiring notice of the action at the time of certification in (b)(3)
cases. 32 Notice, in turn, exercises an important strategic influence
over the conduct of class litigation because the cost of notice can be
substantial, especially in consumer cases with low damages per capita
and large numbers of plaintiffs.
Opt-out rights can also affect subject matter jurisdiction: some
courts have refused to consider the claims of absent class members in
determining whether the amount-in-controversy requirement for
federal diversity jurisdiction was present, on the theory that they
could opt-out of the litigation.
33
B. Commentators' Views on Opt-out Rights
Commentators tend to view opt-out rights favorably, though
many express reservations about particular aspects of opt-out rights.
Such rights are seen as a means for protecting class members'
autonomy of action,34 protecting them from abuse in a distant forum,
3 5
28. See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 1993).
29. See, e.g., Laughman v. Wells Fargo Leasing Corp., No. 96 C 925, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13614, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1997).
30. See, e.g., In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 359, 381 (N.D. Ohio
2001) (providing that "[i]f the defendants settle a case with an opt-out claimant on terms more
favorable than are received under the Settlement Agreement by participating claimants, then
the defendants agree to pay all participating claimants the increment"); see generally Richard A.
Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class Settlements: The Godfather Guide to Opt-Out Rights, 2003
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141 (2003).
31. For example, an attorney who counsels a client in how to conduct an exparte campaign
to solicit absent class members to opt out of a class action may face disqualification and other
sanctions for conduct detrimental to the orderly administration of justice. See Kleiner v. First
Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1200 (11th Cir. 1985).
32. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlyle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974). If, in a settlement
class, the notice does not provide information sufficient to allow a class member to make an
informed decision about whether to opt out, the court may reject the proposal in toto. See
Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 283-84 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a class action
settlement, in part, because certain class members had not received notice adequate to provide
them with information needed to make informed opt-out decision).
33. See, e.g., Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 941 (9th Cir. 2001); Klempner v.
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1238 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
34. See, e.g., John E. Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 3, 79
(1983) (recognizing the right to control one's own litigation).
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and reinforcing their right to adequate representation.3 6 Professor
Coffee views the opt-out right as so significant that he recommends an
additional, delayed opt-out right that begins after the approval of
some class action settlements.37  Professor Molot also endorses
enhanced opt-out rights as a useful reform that would bring class
actions more in line with an administrative law paradigm.38 Professor
Nagareda sees the distinction between opt-out and non-opt-out classes
as fundamental to the nature of class actions and as essential to
structuring a class remedy that comports with notions of corrective
justice. 39 Professors Coffee and Issacharoff analogize the right to opt-
out to the important power of exit enjoyed by members of corporate
governance structures. 40 Professors Koniak and Cohen suggest that
class action attorneys should be subject to civil or criminal liability for
disguising the value of opt-out rights in the notice distributed to the
class.41 Professor Epstein, writing from a libertarian perspective,
applauds the right to opt-out of class actions on autonomy-based
grounds. 42  Another commentator argues that opt-out rights are
required as a matter of due process, not only for (b)(3) class actions,
but also for class actions in general.
43
Not all commentators are as favorably disposed towards opt-
out rights. Professor Perino critiques exclusion rights in mass tort
cases on the ground that they can disrupt settlements that are
valuable to the majority of claimants. 44 Professor Bone questions the
35. See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate
Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 16 (1986) (stating that the
reasoning in Shutts "was based upon the inference of consent from class members' failure to opt
out").
36. See John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419,
1441 (2003) (stating that the individual who opts out might be signaling his unhappiness with
the suit and is essentially protecting his own interests).
37. Coffee, supra note 6, at 420.
38. Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27,
110-12 (2003).
39. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 153-54 (2003).
40. Coffee, supra note 6, at 376-77; Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the
Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 366. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT,
VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
41. Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051,
1056 (1996).
42. Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 510 (2003) ("All options have some positive value, and the control of one's own
litigation cannot be regarded as a small detail within the overall scheme of civil procedure.").
43. Steven T.O. Cottreau, Note, The Due Process Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 480, 528 (1998).
44. Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of Opt-
Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 143-44 (1997).
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ideal of a "day in court" that opt-out rights help enforce. 45 Professor
Redish attacks opt-out rights as facilitating the transformation of
substantive law, within the context of the class action, into a regime
protective of the rights of entities rather than individuals. 46 Professor
Rosenberg argues that opt-out rights can be antithetical to the
purposes of class action litigation, which he sees as achieving a
socially desirable level of deterrence over misconduct by defendants. 47
One commentator claims that class members should be required to
establish good cause before being allowed to opt out.48
Even those commentators who criticize opt-out rights or their
details, however, generally agree about the importance of the
procedure - otherwise they would not be so critical. Professor
Koniak's concern about the mandatory nature of the asbestos
settlement, for example, appears animated by a belief that opt-out
rights would have significantly improved the position of absent class
members. 49 Professor Epstein's endorsement of the autonomy value of
opt-out rights is likewise premised on the notion that these rights
have significant value to class members.50 Even Professor Rosenberg,
although no fan of opt-out rights, assumes their importance when he
criticizes their effect. 51
II. PRIOR RESEARCH ON DISSENT AND THE INSTANT STUDY
This Part first reviews prior empirical work on opt-outs and
objectors and then describes the instant study.
45. Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 195-99 (1992).
46. Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the
Intersection ofPrivate Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 94-102 (2003).
47. David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost Without
Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 23 (2003) (arguing that "allowing members to exit the class
undermines the "basic deterrence objective of collective adjudication."); David Rosenberg,
Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss,
88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1911-16 (2002) (questioning individual autonomy rationale for opt-out
rights); David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Actions: The Only Option for Mass Tort
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 840-43, 896-97 (2002) (advocating mass-tort class actions with no
opt-out rights).
48. Mark W. Friedman, Note, Constrained Individualism in Group Litigation: Requiring
Class Members to Make a Good Cause Showing Before Opting Out of a Federal Class Action, 100
YALE L. J. 745, 745 (1990).
49. See generally Koniak & Cohen, supra note 41.
50. See generally Epstein, supra note 42.
51. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 47.
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A. Prior Studies of Opt-Outs
Little prior empirical work exists on class action opt-outs and
objectors. Thomas E. Willging, Laurel E. Hooper, and Robert J.
Niemic of the Federal Judicial Center included statistics on opt-out
rates in a study of class actions. 52 Their study covered four federal
district courts in major urban areas (Philadelphia, Miami, Chicago,
and San Francisco) and included all class action cases (not just
published opinions) terminated from July 1, 1992 through June 30,
1994. 53 They found a low rate of opt-outs. "Across all four districts,
the median percentage of members who opted out of a settlement was
either 0.1% or 0.2% of the total membership of the class; 75% of the
opt-out cases had 1.2% or fewer of class members opt-out."54 In Rule
23(b)(3) class actions, the percentage of cases with one or more opt-
outs ranged from 9 percent in the Northern District of California to 21
percent in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The vast majority of
cases, therefore, had zero opt-outs. Objector participation was
somewhat higher. "Overall, about half of the settlements that were
the subject of a hearing generated at least one objection. The
percentage of cases in which there was no objection ranged from 42%
to 64% in the four districts . . . ,,55 Willging et al. found their results
to be consistent with an empirical study of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions
conducted twenty years earlier.
56
Other important empirical work on class actions exists but
with less emphasis on quantifying opt-outs.5 7 Deborah Hensler et al.,
in a study by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, provide
quantitative opt-out information for four class action cases studied in
detail. They also find that the rate of opt-outs is quite low as a
52. THOMAS E. WILLGING, LAUREL E. HOOPER, & ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL
REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 45-54 (1996), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/autoframe?openform&url-r=pages/556&url-l=index.
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id. at 10.
55. Id. at 57.
56. Id. at 53-54 (citing Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEO.
L.J. 1123 (1974)).
57. See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER, NICHOLAS M. PACE, BONITA DOMBEY-MOORE, BETH
GIDDENS, JENNIFER GROSS, & ERIK K. MOLLER, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 39 n. 38 (2000) (citing early empirical work on class actions), available
at http://www.rand.org/publicationsMRMR969/; BOB NIEMIC & TOM WILLGING, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, EFFECTS OF AMCHEM/ORTIZ ON THE FILING OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS:
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percentage of the class, although there was considerable variation
among the cases studied.
58
The four-district Federal Judicial Center study and the RAND
data tell a consistent story: opt-outs tend to be less than 1 percent of
class members. But generalizing from them may be premature
because, as the authors of the studies note, they are limited either by
a small number of districts or by a small number of cases. Our study,
with its own limitation to published opinions,5 9 nevertheless can add
substantially to what other class action studies find.
B. The Instant Study
Our study was conducted as follows. We first assembled a
comprehensive database of published class action cases. 60  We
searched in the WestlawTM "ALLCASES" database using the search:
"CLASS ACTION" & (OPT-OUT OR "OPT-OUT" OR "OPTED OUT'
OR "EXCLUDE THEMSELVES" OR "EXCLUDE HIMSELF" OR
"EXCLUDE HERSELF" OR OBJECTOR) & SETTLEMENT &
DATE(=[1993-2003]). 61 This search's results were checked against a
58. Atkins v. Harcross is reported to have had approximately 25 opt-outs out of 3800 class
members. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 57, at 325-26, 333. In re Louisiana-Pacific Inner-Seal
Siding is reported to have had 1497 valid exclusions out of a potential class of 700,000 to 900,000
homes. Id. at 389. Cox v. Shell Oil had 32,000 opt-outs out of several million mailings. Id. at
356-57. Roberts v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. is said to have had 103 opt-outs out of "hundreds of
thousands" of class members. Id. at 162-65.
59. Our dataset looks only to opinions that, for whatever reason, were published in some
readily available form and thereby omits opinions that were not published. Obviously, therefore,
we have not included the full universe of cases in our dataset. Although published opinions are
not necessarily representative of the universe of all cases, however, they can lead to important
insights. Our quantitative statements are of course estimates, but they represent substantially
more informed estimates than those made without comprehensive knowledge of the opinions.
And opinions are in one important respect representative. For judges seeking to inform their fee
decisions with knowledge of other cases, published opinions are the prime source of data. Cf.
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal
Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1195 (1991).
60. A similar, but not identical, database was employed in an earlier study on attorneys'
fees in class action settlements. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Attorneys' Fees in
Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 27, 28 (2004).
61. We included the search term "settlement" to make the results tractable. Although this
search term tends to restrict the data set to settled class actions, its use can be justified by the
fact that postcertification, most certified class actions likely settle, and when class actions go to a
judgment on the merits, class member objections to the judgment are not likely allowed, and opt-
out rates are unlikely to be reported in a written opinion. It should be noted that the low rate of
judgments on the merits - and especially the low rate of trials - in class action cases may not
materially differ from rates in other federal litigation. WILLGING ET AL., supra note 52, at 66.
"The trial rate in class actions in each of the four districts was not notably different from the 3%
to 6% trial rate for nonprisoner nonclass civil actions .... " Id. In addition, "[plaintiff classes
and individual plaintiffs did not fare well at trial. Except for one default judgment that led to a
class settlement, no trial resulted in a final judgment for a plaintiff class." Id. (footnote omitted).
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search of the LexisTM "Mega" database using the same search terms.
We also compiled lists of citations in the cases found by these search
requests and included any additional cases in the dataset. The
searches yielded many more cases than are included in the study
because a case satisfying the search terms' criteria need not contain
quantitative data on opt-outs or objectors. Thus, the class action cases
in the study represent only a fraction of all class action activity. One
would, however, expect that judges in cases with substantial
proportions of opt-outs or objectors would tend to comment on opt-outs
or objections more than in cases with little or no opt-out or objection
activity. If that is so, then the generally low level of opt-out or
objector activity we find in published opinions may in fact overstate
dissent in class action cases.
In interpreting the data, we had to address the fact that opt-
outs and objections (in theory at least) serve different functions and
are available in different situations. Opt-outs represent the exercise
of an option to "exit" the case, whereas objections represent the
exercise of a "voice."6 2 In theory, a given class member cannot exercise
both rights in a single case: if both are available, the class member
must decide whether to (1) opt-out and pursue relief (if at all) outside
the class case; or (2) remain in the case, accept relief under the
settlement, and agree to be bound by the preclusive effect of the
release, while attempting to influence the court's fairness review by
lodging an objection to the settlement.
Four logical situations exist with respect to opt-out and
objection rights:
First, class members can object but not opt out. This situation
occurs in settled mandatory class actions under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2),
in which class members have no right to opt-out but may object to the
proposed settlement.
Second, class members can opt out but not object. This
situation occurs in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions that are litigated to
judgment on the merits rather than settled. Our data include no such
cases, both because litigated class actions do not generate opinions
that report such data and because, for purposes of tractability, we
limited our search to cases that included the term "settlement."
Third, class members can neither opt out nor object. This
situation occurs in mandatory class actions under Rule 23(b)(1) or
(b)(2) that are litigated to a judgment on the merits rather than
62. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 376, 376 n.17 (employing vocabulary adopted from ALBERT
0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,
AND STATES (1970) (discussing alternative strategies for involvement in political communities)).
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settled. Again, our data include no such cases for reasons stated in
the previous paragraph.
Fourth, class members can either opt out or object, but not
both.6 3 This situation occurs in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions that result
in a settlement. As to these, two sub-categories are important:
In the case of litigation classes in which the action is certified
prior to a settlement, class members must elect to opt out or remain in
the case at the time of certification. Once the case is settled, class
members who have not opted out may object to the settlement but
ordinarily may not opt out.64 In general, opt-out information is not
available for such cases because the court has no reason to report the
opt-outs when issuing an opinion on the fairness of the settlement.
We do, however, find two instances of opinions in litigation classes
that disclose the number of opt-outs.
In the case of settlement classes in which final approval of
certification and settlement occurs at the same time, class members
ordinarily have a choice of either opting out of the settlement and
pursuing their individual remedies if they desire or remaining in the
case and enjoying the right to object to the settlement terms. Here,
courts frequently report opt-out rates, on the theory that these data
provide a measure of the class's reaction to the settlement.
These differences are important because they affect both the
data reported in the decisions as well as our analysis of the data. For
example, if the action is a mandatory class action without opt-out
rights, it would hardly be sensible to conclude from the absence of opt-
outs that class members did not care about the right to exclude
themselves. Similarly, if the action reaches a litigated judgment, we
should hardly conclude that a member's failure to object indicates that
the right to object is not valued - objections are not heard in such
cases. We resolved this issue by both separately counting objections
and opt-outs and only including cases in which it was clear that the
class member enjoyed such rights.
We used the following conventions, or protocols, in gathering
data.
1. For relief, we included the full relief for the class (including
the value of attorneys' fees) plus costs of notice or settlement
63. In general, the right to opt out and the right to object are considered to be mutually
exclusive: the class member has to elect one or the other. See, e.g., Mortimer v. River Oaks
Toyota, 663 N.E.2d 113, 116 (Ill. App. 1996) (plaintiffs who objected but did not opt out were
subject to the preclusive effect of the judgment in a settled class action).
64. This is not true in the unusual situation where, post settlement, the court allows a




administration paid by the defendant, if these were quantified in the
opinion. If the court gave a reasonable range for the value of the class
recovery, we used the midpoint. If the recovery could reasonably be
calculated from other data in the opinion, we calculated it even if the
class recovery was not explicitly stated.
2. For the type of action, we used judgment as to the principal
nature of the case, even if several causes of action were pleaded.
3. We used the absolute number of persons or entities who
objected. Even if multiple parties filed identical objections, we
counted all parties. Where the court gave an estimate of objectors as
"more than" a certain number or "less than" a certain number, we
used the court's baseline number.
4. We used the number of class members if the court provided
this, or the court's estimate of the number if no precise number was
provided. Otherwise, we used the number of notices distributed as a
proxy for the class size. We recognize that this can be only a
reasonable approximation of class size because (a) it was often the
case that the defendant's files did not contain a complete list of class
member names and addresses (this is particularly a problem in
securities class actions since many shares of stock are held in street
name, with the beneficial owners known only to brokers); and (b) not
all mailed notices were correctly addressed, resulting in a percentage
of returns for all class actions of any significant size. Even if the court
indicated the percentage or absolute number of notices that were
returned as undeliverable, we included the total number of notice
forms sent out in order to preserve consistency with other cases.
In shareholders' derivative actions, we used the number of
shareholders if this was available.
5. The "approved" variable codes whether the settlement
ultimately received approval by the courts, including any appeals. If
the court of appeals approved the settlement in part but rejected it in
part, we coded the outcome as not approved.
6. As to the number of objectors, we included objections of any
sort, including objections to the settlement or objections to the
proposed attorney fee. If a single objection was brought on behalf of
multiple class members, we included the total number of class
members involved, if this number was available.
III. RESULTS
This Part first reports basic descriptive results of key features
of class action litigation relating to opt-outs and objections. It then
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explores regression models of opt-out patterns and the relation
between class approval and opt-outs.
A. Statistical Description of Aggregate Opt-out Behavior
Table 1 reports statistics pertaining to key variables. It shows
that the number of opt-outs varies widely, with a median of twenty
class members opting out and a mean of 1,706 opt-outs. Similarly, the
number of objectors varies, with a median of only three objectors per
case.
These absolute levels of dissent are incomplete without
knowledge of the size of the class. Table 1 shows a median class size
of 22,496 members. The most telling statistics are the percentages.
The median percentage of class members opting out, in the 143 cases
in which the opinion reveals both the number of opt-outs and the
number of class members, is a mere 0.1 percent. The median
percentage of class members objecting is zero in the 205 cases with the
necessary data. Opt-out and objector percentages are thus trivial.
Table 1. Characteristics of Class Action Litigation
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Number of cases
Number of opt-outs 1706.3 20.0 6228.8 159
Number of objectors 137.9 3.0 673.4 236
Percent opt-outs 0.6 0.1 1.8 143
Percent objectors 1.1 0.0 5.9 205
Number in class 603,692.6 22,496.0 1,900,000.0 215
Percent class approved 91.4 100.0 28.1 245
Class recovery (millions $2003) 173.8 10.8 611.2 187
Attorneys' fees (millions $2003) 14.0 2.5 42.9 198
Fee as percent of recovery 26.4 25.0 22.3 159
Recovery per class member 3662.0 553.6 10,434.8 161
Percent of sample consisting of 2467.3--
mandatory class actions
Percent of sample consisting of 2462.8-
litigation classes
Percent federal cases 90.0 - 251
Percent appellate 13.5 251
Source: Class action settlement opinions 1993 to 2003.
Figure 1 explores the relationship between class size and the
number of opt-outs and objectors. The figure's y-axis shows the
number of opt-outs or objectors. The figure's x-axis divides the sample
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into deciles based on class size. For example, the smallest 10 percent
of classes have fewer than 800 members and largest 10 percent of
classes have more than 1.2 million members. The figure indicates
that the sixth or seventh deciles in number of class action members,
corresponding to 23,000 to 100,000 class members, are the deciles in
which one begins to see nontrivial numbers of class members opting
out. The number of opt-outs and objectors does not begin to approach
100 per case until class membership is well into five figures (note that
Figure l's y-axis shows the square root of the number of dissenters).
The median number objecting never reaches 100, even in the largest
class-member decile, for which the mean number of class members
exceeds one million.
Figure 1. Number of Class Action Opt Outs & Objectors
by Class Size Decile
2 0
z a - _._- - _. -- ---.. ....
,.0
<.08 .08-.2 .2-.53 .53-1.4 1.4-2.3 2.3-4.6 4.6-10 10-30 30-120 >120
Deciles of number in class (tens of thousands)
Mean number opting out -..... Median number opting out
w w M ean n',umber objecting --------- M edian number objecting -
Note. The y-axis shows the number of opt-outs or objectors for each decile of class
membership size, using a square root transformation to help represent graphically the
nonlinear pattern. The x-axis divides the sample into deciles based on class size.
Source: Class action settlement opinions 1993 to 2003.
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Figure 2. Percent of Class Opting Out or Objecting
by Class Size Decile
0-
~o
<.08 .08-.2 .2-.53 .53-1.4 1.4-2.3 2.3-4.6 4.6-10 10-30 30-120 >120
Deciles of number in class (tens of thousands)
- Mean percent opting out ----- Median percent opting out
--- Mean percent objecting --------- Median percent objecting
Note. The y-axis shows the percent of the class opting out or objecting for each decile of
class membership size. The x-axis divides the sample into deciles based on class size.
Source: Class action settlement opinions 1993 to 2003.
B. Opt-outs and Objectors by Case Type
One expects dissent rates to vary by case type. Table 2
explores the relation between case type and opt-out and objector
behavior. For example, the table's first numerical column shows that
the mean number of opt-outs ranges from a mere two in Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act cases to over 18,000 in mass tort cases.
Although the table's first three columns show that the number of opt-
outs varies substantially, the second three-column group>-which
reports the percent of a class opting out--shows that opt-out rates are
low for all case types. The median opt-out rate is about 1 percent or
less for all case types other than mass tort. For that case type, the
median opt-out rate is 4.2 percent and the mean 4.6 percent. Thus, for
all case categories the inclusion rate (100 percent minus the opt-out
percent) is over 95 percent. This constancy persists despite the vast
range of class sizes shown in the third cluster of numerical columns-
from a median of about 1,000 for employment discrimination cases to
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a median of 2,000,000 for product liability cases (though only four
product liability cases have available data).
Table 2. Opt-outs by Case Type & Recovery per Class Member
Number of Opt-outs Percent Opt-outs
Mean Median N Mean Median N
898.4 121.0 19 0.6 0.2 15
19.5 7.5 6 0.7 0.2 6
67.8 36.0 4 1.4 1.2 4
2935.3 513.0 39 0.2 0.1 39
30.0 30.0 1 0.2 0.2 1
425.0 425.0 2 0.0 0.0 2
99.5 4.5 6 1.4 0.3 5
27.0 24.0 3 2.2 1.t 3
2.0 1.0 9 0.0 0.0 9
18,499.3 7257.0 6 4.6 4.2 4
2045 1311.0 4 0.1 0.1 4
353.2 2.0 51 0.7 0.0 43
74.6 42.0 8 0.1 0.1 8
1717.t 20.0 158 0.6 0.1 143

















































Note. FDCPA cases are Fair Debt Collection Practices Act cases. Source: Class action
settlement opinionsl993 to 2003.
Table 3 reports on objector behavior by case type. The table's
fourth through sixth numerical columns show the objection rate to be
similarly low. Across all case types, as reported in the "Total" row, the
median objection rate is zero and the mean is 1.1 percent of class
members. Only in commercial cases does the objection rate rise to
nontrivial levels, but this case type has only four cases in the sample.
No other case type displays a mean objection rate of even 5 percent of
class members. Like opt-outs, objectors are rare and this result varies
































































































Note. FDCPA cases are Fair Debt Collection Practices Act cases. Source: Class action
settlement opinions 1993 to 2003.
C. Opt-out and Objector Behavior Over Time
Previous research suggests no significant time trend from 1993
through 2002 in the size of class action recoveries or in the amount of
attorney fees to class action counsel.65 To explore the relationship
between class action dissent and time, we first summarize, by year,
the mean and median rates of opting out and objection. These results
are reported in the Appendix and form the basis for Figure 3. To
ensure a reasonable number of cases in each time period, we
aggregate time periods as shown on the x-axis in Figure 3.
Over time, the most definite trend is the downward movement
of the mean percentage of objectors to class action settlements. The
rate dropped from 2.0 to 2.5 percent in the 1993 through 1997 period
to less than 0.5 percent in the periods 2000-2003. The median
percentage of objectors does not show a similar trend. It is
consistently so low that there is little room for it to decrease. The
mean opt-out rate also shows descent, although the slope of the
descent is not as steep as in the case of objectors: opt-outs started at
65. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 60, at 28.
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Table 3. Objectors by Case Type
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slightly over 1 percent in 1993 to 1995 and declined to about 0.5
percent in 2002-2003. Furthermore, any noticeable declining trend in
the mean opt-out rate occurred from 1993 through 1997. Like the
median objector rate, the median opt-out rate is consistently so low
that it cannot be expected meaningfully to decrease.








Mean percent opting out
- ---- Mean percent objecting
- Median percent opting out
-Median percent objecting
Note. The y-axis shows the percent of the class opting out or objecting for each time
period. The x-axis divides the sample into time periods. Source: Class action settlement
opinions 1993 to 2003.
D. Explaining the Pattern of Dissenting Behavior
Tables 1 to 3 show the aggregate patterns of opt-out and
objector behavior and the patterns by case type. Figure 3 shows the
pattern over time. We now study simultaneously these and other
possible influences on opt-out and objector behavior. We do so
through regression models seeking to explain the pattern of opt-out
and objector behavior and to determine whether opt-out or objector
behavior affect attorney fee award levels. Although Willging et al.
report that class members or other interested parties did not object to
fees very often, they do report nontrivial rates of concern about fees.66
66. WILLGING ETAL., supra note 52, at 76.
-- - -- - - ---\- - - -
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If class-member concerns about fees help explain dissent patterns,
then one can plausibly model class dissent as a function of the
percentage awarded as attorney fees as well as a function of case type
and time.
Using a measure of the fee as an explanatory variable for the
rate of opt-outs or dissenters raises an issue about the direction of
causation. It may well be that dissent-especially the objection rate--
is a function of fee awards; objectors may tend to emerge in part when
fees are thought to take too large a fraction of the recovery. But it
may also be true that fee awards are a function of dissent. For
example, a court may regard a high rate of opting out or objection as
evidence that reflects on counsel's performance and therefore
warrants a reduced fee. Whatever the relation between dissent and
fee, the fee percentage recovered by counsel is not merely or primarily
a function of dissent rates. A scaling effect exists in which a primary
determinant of the fee percentage is the size of the class recovery. 67
Fee percentage declines as class recovery increases, 68 so exploring the
relationship between dissent and fee requires also accounting for the
size of recovery.
Figure 4 explores this relation in this new dataset. It confirms
that the recovery is the overwhelming determinant of the fee in this
dataset. The correlation between the fee and recovery is r = 0.95. The
massive explanatory power of the recovery of course makes it difficult
for other factors in a modest-sized sample to detectably influence the
fee. Thus, we are skeptical that opt-out or objector behavior will be
seen to affect the fee. In any event, one cannot simply examine the fee
as a function of dissent; one must at least include the size of the class
recovery in modeling the fee.







CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 1553
Figure 4. Fee As A Function of Recovery
1 1
6 8
Class Recovery (log(10)) $2003
Note. The y-axis shows the attorney fee in inflation-adjusted year 2003 dollars. The x-
axis shows the class recovery in inflation-adjusted year 2003 dollars. Log
transformations are used due to the log-normal distribution of the data. Source: Class
action settlement opinions 1993 to 2003.
These considerations suggest that a single regression model
equation cannot capture much of what is going on in explaining class
action dissent. Any single-equation model likely will suffer from
endogeneity. 69 Fee percentage used to explain dissenting behavior is
not exogenous because the fee, as a percentage of recovery, may well
depend on dissenting behavior. Fee percentage thus may be a
function of dissenting behavior as well as of gross class recovery. To
address these issues, we use three-stage least squares70 to estimate a
system of three equations, as follows:
(1) fee level as a function of class recovery, dissent rate (opt-out or objector), and time;
69. Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey, & Martin T. Wells, But Was He Sorry? The
Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1637 (1998) (citation omitted).
70. See generally WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS chs. 14-15 (5th ed. 2002).
Results do not materially differ across the key variables of interest in two stage least squares










(2) Dissent rate (opt-out or objector) as a function of case type, fee percent, recovery per
class member, and time;
(3) Fee percentage (proportion) as a function of class recovery, case type, and time.
Table 4 reports the results for these simultaneously estimated
equations.
Model (1) is the system of three equations relating to opt-outs,
with fee level and fee percentage simultaneously modeled. Model (2)
is the same system of equations as model (1) except that objectors
replace the opt-outs. The models include the variable "Year" to track
any linear time trend that might exist. A series of case-type dummy
variables, included in the fee proportion and opt-out equations,
represent each of the major case categories, with smaller case
categories combined into the reference category. Because of their
similarity, we combine Consumer and Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act cases into a single category type. In the attorney fee level and fee
proportion equations, the principal explanatory variable is the client
recovery. Dissent rates are included as explanatory variables in these
equations to try and detect any marginal effect they might have given
the powerful influence of the class recovery.
One may expect that opt-out and objection rates are associated
with levels of client recovery, but the causal relation is not necessarily
unidirectional. For types of cases with large awards, one might expect
clients to be more able to attract individual counsel. As noted by
Willging et al.:
For very large awards, say in a products liability case involving serious personal
injuries, one would expect the opt-out rate to increase as the size of the expected award
increases because individuals with more serious than average injuries would be able to
obtain representation and pursue a larger individual award.
7 1
For cases comprising classes that have expected awards too low
to support individual lawsuits on a contingent basis, "one might expect
that class members would have more incentive in the larger cases to
remain in the class and recover an award in the thousands of
dollars."72 These considerations suggest the need to include a measure
of recovery in modeling dissent rates. We do so by including the
recovery per class member (log) as an explanatory variable of opt-out
and objection rates (the middle equation reported in Table 4 for both
model (1) and model (2)). We have run, but do not report, models in
which dummy variables for federal court cases and appellate court
cases are included in all equations. Those models do not differ
materially from those reported in Table 4.




Turning to results, the opt-out rate (the middle column
equation in model (1)) is significantly associated with the recovery per
class member. As that recovery increases, so does the opt-out rate.
This relationship logically cannot be a consequence of increasing
dissatisfaction as the recovery per class member increases. Rather, it
may be a function of the association of high per-class-member
recoveries with opting out class members believing that they can do
better on their own, or as part of a different class action law suit, than
as members of the class from which they opt-out. These larger per-
member stakes cases may well be the ones in which competing counsel
may try to galvanize an opt-out movement or in which the economics
of the case could support individual contingent fee counsel.
The objection rate (the middle column equation in model (2))
also shows a statistically significant positive association between
recovery per class member and dissent. These large-recovery cases
may spawn the belief that even more could be had, leading class
members who do not opt out nevertheless to object to the settlement.
Some case type effects emerge. As suggested by Table 2's
relatively high opt-out rate for mass tort cases, the opt-out percentage
is significantly higher in mass tort cases than in the reference
category. As suggested by Table 3, the mass tort effect does not
persist when one models the objection rate in model (2) in contrast to
model (1)'s opt-out rate.
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Table 4. Regression Models of Opt-Out and Objector Rates
Class Recovery (log(10)) $2003
Percent opt-outs (square root)
Percent objectors (square root)
Year










(1) = Three-stage least squares estimates















































(2) = Three-stage least squares






















































Note. "Attorney fee level" is in logs and in inflation-adjusted $2003. "Percent opt-outs"
and "Percent objectors" are square root transformations rather than other
transformations that are sensitive to the presence of many zero values. "Fee
proportion" is a logit transformation (ln(y/(1-y)) of the attorney fee as a proportion of
the class recovery. Case categories with relatively few observations are combined into
the reference category for the case category dummy variables. FDCPA cases are Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act cases. Source: Class action settlement opinions 1993 to
2003.
Table 3 shows that civil rights cases have a relatively high
objection rate, the highest mean and median rates of any sizeable case
type. Table 4's model (2) confirms a significant positive relationship
between civil rights cases and the rate of objections (although no such
relationship existed for rates of opt-outs). Securities cases have a
significantly lower objection rate than the reference category, a result
consistent with Table 3's evidence that securities cases have (along
with consumer cases) the lowest rate of objection of any sizeable case
type. Mass tort cases show a significant and positive relation with
opt-outs, but not objections.
1556
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In neither model do we find a significant association between
the number of dissenters (opt-outs or objectors) and the level of the
attorney fee or the fee percentage. The size of the class recovery
overwhelmingly shapes both the fee level and the fee percentage.
The 'Year" variable is negative and near-significant in the
"Percent opt-outs" and "Percent objectors" equations, suggesting
declining dissent from class action settlements over time as reflected
in Figure 3. This is also consistent with Willging et al.'s suggestion
that their four-district study's findings "indicate that opting out may
have declined [over time] significantly.
'73
E. Exploring the Pattern of Class Approval
Table 5 reports class action case characteristics, now divided by
settlement approval status. Given the small number of unapproved
settlement cases, the figures reported here should be treated with
caution.
73. WILLGING ET AL., supra note 52, at 53-54. Although it is not the focus of this paper, it is
worth noting that both "Fee proportion" equations and model (1)'s "Attorney fee level" equation
show a positive, significant coefficient for the 'Year" variable. In model (2), the "Year" variable
in the "Attorney fee level" equation is positive and near- significant. This contrasts with earlier
findings that fee awards had not increased in the decade from 1993 to 2002. Eisenberg & Miller,
supra note 60, at 57. The significance of the "Year" coefficient is attributable not to a long-term
increase but to high mean fee percents in 2002 and 2003. Simple median regression models
reveal no significant increase over time. It is too early to tell if mean increase will become a
long-term trend.
Direct comparison with the results in Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 60, is limited by the
different size of the sample, by the fact that the current data are not coded for whether the case
involved a fee-shifting statute, and by other coding differences. We have run models in which we
include variables to account for fee-shifting statutes based on the type of case (for example, civil
rights cases typically would involve a fee-shifting statute so we coded them all as fee-shifting)
and the principal results reported here do not materially change.
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Table 5. Characteristics of Class Action Litigation: by
Settlement Approval Status
Settlement Approved Settlement not approved
Variable Mean Median N Mean Median N
Number of opt-outs 1767.1 19.0 142 1269.8 600.0 16
Number of objectors 70.3 2.0 213 875.3 23.5 20
Percent opt-outs 0.7 0.1 128 0.3 0.2 15
Percent objectors 0.8 0.0 186 4.5 0.1 17
Number in class 569,165.5 20,000.0 195 983,035.5 174,000.0 18
Class recovery (millions $2003) 180,000,000 11,000,000 176 110,000,000 5,000,000 I1
Attorneys' fees (millions $2003) 14,000,000 2,500,000 185 16,000,000 2,100,000 I1
Fee as percent of recovery 26.5 25.0 152 25.4 20.0 7
Recovery per class member 3601.3 553.6 153 4822.9 577.5 8
Source: Class action settlement opinions 1993 to 2003.
Several variables behave as one might expect. For example,
median and mean objection rates ("Percent objectors") are higher in
unapproved settlements than in approved settlements. This result
may indicate that the courts take a relatively high level of dissent into
account when deciding whether to approve a settlement, or that both
the court and the objecting class members independently conclude
that the proposed settlement is not in the best interests of the class.
Similarly, the median number of opt-outs in cases with approved
settlements is 19.0 out of a median class size of 20,000; the median
number of opt-outs in cases with unapproved settlement is 600 out of
a median class of 174,000. The opt-out rate in this aggregate view is
thus higher in cases in which settlement is not approved.
But not all variables conform to the expected pattern.
Approved settlements have a median opt-out rate of 0.1 percent,
compared to unapproved settlements' 0.2 percent. The approved
settlements even have a higher mean opt-out rate. Mean and median
recoveries per class member are higher in unapproved settlements.
And mean and median attorneys' fees are lower in unapproved
settlements. Whatever influences courts to reject class settlements, it
does not appear to be the objectively measurable facts studied here,
such as dissent rates, recoveries per class member, or attorney fee
awards.
Table 6 reports the rate of settlement approval by case type.
For each case type, the first row in the table shows the number of
disapproved and approved settlements. The next row reports the
percentages. Table 6 shows an overall settlement approval rate of
over 90 percent. Superficial variation exists across case types. For
1558 [Vol. 57:5:1529
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example, some case types with nontrivial numbers of cases, ERISA
and mass tort, have 100 percent approval rates. But the overall
pattern is one of overwhelming approval, with noticeable disapproval
rates emerging only for case types with few cases in the sample. And
one cannot reject the hypothesis that the overall variation in the
approval pattern could occur by chance (p = 0.116; Fisher's exact test).
Regression models of the pattern of class approval do not aid
materially in explaining the pattern of settlement approvals.









































































Note. The first row for each case type shows the number of disapproved and approved
settlements. The next row reports the percents. FDCPA cases are Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act cases. Source: Class action settlement opinions 1993 to 2003.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
We turn now to the implications of our study. Perhaps the
most significant empirical finding is that opt-outs and objections,

















practice, are in fact very uncommon. In general, one may surmise
that class members do not highly value these rights that courts and
commentators have so widely praised as essential to the justification
for group litigation involving absent parties.
Moreover, even the observed rates of opt-outs and objections
may overstate the actual level of dissent. Available evidence suggests
that when high numbers of dissenters emerge, it is often because an
attorney or consortium of attorneys has solicited the class to
encourage dissent.74 Further, a person opting out of a case may not
object to the litigation or the settlement. Sometimes people opt out
because they have received the class notice in error and wish to bring
to the court's attention the fact that they are not members of the
class. 75  Some opt out because they are confused. Similarly, people
may "object" to a settlement on grounds having little to do with the
settlement itself-for example, general disagreement with class action
litigation or a belief that the defendant has not done anything wrong.
If opt-outs and objections are relatively insignificant to most
class members in most class actions, this result has consequences for a
variety of class action doctrines and principles.
A. Notice
The study suggests reasons for doubting the wisdom of the
Supreme Court's ruling in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,76 which
required that even in large scale, small claim class actions, individual
notice of class certification must be provided to all class members
74. An example is In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Litigation, No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *17 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994). Similarly, in In re Mexico Money
Transfer Litigation, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 2000), aff'd, 267 F.3d 743 (7th Cir.
2001), 90 percent of the opt-outs were obtained by a dissident attorney who objected to the
settlement. (One of us (Miller) acted as an expert witness for the defendant in the fairness
hearing in this case.) See also Pederson v. AvridaIJMB Partners LLP, No. 92 C 7148, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2109, at *42 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 1994) (dissident attorney launched an opt-out
campaign); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir.
2003) (questioning whether counsel who organizes an opt-out campaign should be allowed to
launch a competing class action). An example of a campaign by a dissident attorney to solicit
objections is In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America Sales Practices Litigation, 177 F.R.D. 216
(D.N.J. 1997), aff'd 148 F.3d 283, 318 (3d Cir. 1998). See also Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley
Petroleum Co., 864 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 67 F.3d 1072 (2d Cir. 1995) (only
20 of 2,700 objections were independent of dissident counsel). Where opt-outs or objections are
the result of attorney activism, there may be less reason to conclude that the reported numbers
reflect genuine antagonism on the part of class members. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Engine
Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1139 n. 60 (7th Cir. 1979) ("Solicitations to opt-out tend to
reduce the effectiveness of (b)(3) class actions for no legitimate reason.").
75. See, e.g., In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 164, 176 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
76. 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974).
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whose names and addresses could be identified with reasonable
effort. 77 It would be an oversimplification to rely only on opt-out rates
to determine which members of the class value the right to receive
notice, because some members of the class will decide not to opt-out
but still value the opportunity to make their own decision. The data
suggest, however, that except in unusual cases, class members display
by their behavior that they do not value the right to receive notice.
The cost of individual notice, which can be significant,78 represents
both a loss to the class and a deadweight cost for society. In some
cases, the per capita cost of notice to class members who opt-out
greatly exceeds the per capita recovery for the class. 79 Our study
suggests that publication and/or electronic notice may be a sufficient
means of notifying the class of certification in the case of large-scale,
small claims class actions.
80
B. Personal Jurisdiction
The results reported above also undermine the idea that absent
class members may be taken to consent to the court's jurisdiction over
their person by virtue of their failure to opt out of the action. The
overwhelming inaction displayed by class members in the reported
cases suggests that a class member's failure to opt out should not
readily be equated to an affirmative consent to jurisdiction. Common
sense indicates that apathy, not decision, is the basis for inaction.
Even when a class member does opt out, his or her decision is
probably not based on jurisdictional objections. The class member
might opt out for many reasons--distrust in class counsel,
unwillingness to sue, or (in settlement classes) disapproval of the
relief obtained. The data thus suggest that the Shutts notion of
consent to jurisdiction based on failure to opt out is fictional.81 Rather
77. See generally id.
78. See, e.g., In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 310 n.12 (N.D. Ga.
1993) (notice cost was $7,039,992).
79. An example is In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litigation, 205 F.R.D. 369
(D.D.C. 2002), a parens patriae antitrust case against pharmaceutical firms. Id. at 373. The
court reported notice costs of $8,250,000. Id. at 382. Of the 1,281,128 class members, 2,360
opted out or filed objections to a net class recovery of approximately $67,000,000. Thus, it cost an
average of $3,495 to provide notice to each dissenting class member in a case where the average
recovery was roughly $52.
80. Individual notice would still be appropriate in the case of settlement classes where the
notice also includes a mechanism, such as a claim form, for obtaining the relief.
81. We are not the first to highlight the weakness in the Shutts analysis of opt-outs. See,
e.g., 3 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13.37, at 13-105 (the
"suggest[ion] that the failure of class members to opt-out of the suit equals consent to
jurisdiction.., does not withstand analysis"); Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and
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than focusing on an imaginary form of consent, the courts might more
appropriately examine whether class members without minimum
contacts with the forum state are adequately represented by counsel.
82
C. Adequacy of Counsel and Class Representatives
The low level of opt-outs and objections also suggests that these
procedures do not provide a reliable means for ensuring that class
members receive adequate representation from competent and
nonconflicted counsel and class representatives. Class members-
especially those with small claims -appear to be rationally ignorant
about the qualifications of their representatives and accordingly tend
to do nothing when offered the opportunity to opt-out or object. As a
result, our study suggests that courts should be especially vigilant to
police the adequacy of counsel in class action cases and should not rely
on the opt-out or objection processes as reliable indicators of quality.
D. Settlements
Our study also provides information about the use of the opt-
out experience in a particular case as an aid to the judicial evaluation
of the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement.
The results show that percentages of opt-outs and objectors are
almost always small. Does this suggest that, in general, class action
settlements represent good value for the class? One possible
interpretation of the data is that class action counsel and
representative plaintiffs filter out bad class action settlements, either
Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1170 n.95
(1998); Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 609-10
(1987).
82. In this recommendation we join a number of other commentators who have perceived
the weakness of Shutts' consent theory of jurisdiction and accordingly have stressed the
importance of adequate representation. Professor Monaghan, for example, argues that the
jurisdiction conferred over absent class members by a class member's failure to opt out of the
action is limited and conditional: it can be defeated at any time if the representation provided by
the named plaintiff and class counsel falls short of the minimum constitutionally required for
adequate representation. See Monaghan, supra note 81, at 1172-73 (noting that "Hansberry v.
Lee and other decisions make clear that, to bind absent class members on the basis of
representation, there must, at a minimum, have been adequate representation") (citation
omitted). Professor Nagareda stresses the need for structural assurances of adequacy at the
time jurisdiction is conferred, rather than on adequacy-in-fact throughout the case. Nagareda,
supra note 39, at 184. These commentators differ in important respects - Professor Monaghan's
theory, for example, would open up greater room for collateral attack on class action judgments
on the ground that class representation became inadequate as the case progressed - but their
essential message is the same: that adequacy of representation is an important and irreplaceable
complement to opt-out rights as a prerequisite to a state court's jurisdiction over absent parties
without minimum contacts with the state.
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because they are serving as loyal and competent advocates for the
class or because they want to avoid triggering dissent by class
members. The truly unfair or weak settlements never see the light of
day. The filtering out of weak resolutions leaves only the strong to
survive, and class members understandably do not revolt against what
should be reasonable settlements. Thus, the low levels of dissent
could be consistent with the proposition that the vast majority of
settlements represent good value for the class. We suspect that the
important filtering mechanism plays some role in explaining the
pattern of what we observe. But we also suspect that the courts have
ascribed more of a role to opt-out and objection behavior than may be
warranted in light of the uniformly low dissent rates we observe.
Class members appear to be behaving out of apathy or rational
ignorance rather than making a considered choice not to opt out or
object.
Even if low levels of dissent do not reliably indicate that class
action settlements are generally fair and reasonable, the rate of
dissent in a particular case might provide some information about
settlement quality. However, the signal is a weak one at best. First,
because dissent levels tend to be so low, they may not provide
information of statistical value in a given case. Moreover, we find that
the percentage of opt-outs and objectors decreases as class size grows.
Thus, in larger cases where the number of opt-outs and objectors
might be large enough to provide valuable information to the court,
the percentages of the class dissenting tend to be so small as to reduce
the quality of the signal.
Cross-case comparisons of dissent rates provide interesting, but
ultimately ambiguous, information. Opt-outs and objections are
significantly associated with the size of recovery per class member.
Dissent seems to grow larger as individual recoveries increase-a
superficially counterintuitive result. Because we have not controlled
for the strength and magnitude of cases, this relationship does not
suggest that class members become more dissatisfied as outcomes
improve. Rather, class members who dissent appear to be acting
rationally by taking affirmative steps to protect their interests when
their interests become sufficiently large to be worth protecting.
Opt-outs and objections provide little or no assistance to the
court in determining fees for class counsel. Overwhelmingly, fees are
determined by a single factor: the size of the recovery for the class as a
whole. We found no significant association between the number of
dissenters and either the gross fee or the fee as a percentage of class
recovery. Our study thus suggests that courts should not ordinarily
look to statistics on opt-outs and objectors when setting fees (although
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objectors may provide valuable information that courts could consider
when deliberating on this issue).
Statistics on judicial approval or disapproval of settlements
provide only weak support for the proposition that dissent levels are
an indicator of settlement quality. We found that the percentage of
objectors was greater in cases where the settlement was rejected than
in cases where the settlement was approved. This finding suggests
that courts do take the percentage of objectors into account, at least to
some extent, when ruling on the fairness of settlements. Assuming
judicial decisions approving or disapproving settlements are generally
accurate, this finding also suggests that levels of objection provide
some evidence of a settlement's fairness, adequacy, and
reasonableness. When it comes to opt-outs, however, the results are
not as predicted: the mean percentage of opt-outs in approved
settlements was in fact greater than the mean percentage of opt-outs
in disapproved settlements (although the median percentage of opt-
outs was higher in disapproved settlements than in approved ones).
Our study provides perspective on the inference, frequently
found in the cases, that the reaction of the class provides valuable
data about the fairness of the settlement. It suggests that courts
should give little or no weight to opt-out rates, but that rates of
objection can provide weak evidence of settlement quality, keeping in
mind the possibility that mass objections may be manufactured by
dissident counsel seeking to upset a settlement. Overall,
notwithstanding frequent statements in judicial decisions to the
contrary,8 3 the level of dissent is at best weak evidence of the fairness,
adequacy, and reasonableness of class action settlements.8 4
83. See, e.g., Laskey v. Int'l Union, 638 F.2d 954, 956 (6th Cir. 1980) (placing significance on
the fact that "only seven out of 109 made any kind of objection"); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust
Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 180 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981) ("virtually no
objections from members of the settlement class" seen as a "significant element" of settlement
fairness); Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131, 148 (3d Cir. 1978) (one of the factors used to
determine the fairness of the settlement was that an "overwhelming majority" had not objected);
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 508, 520 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (small number of opt-
outs indicates "overwhelming approval"); In re Newbridge Networks Sec. Litig., No. CIV. A. 94-
1678-LFO, 1998 WL 765724, at * 2 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 1998) (small number of opt-outs creates a
"strong inference" of satisfaction with a settlement); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab.
Litig., 176 F.R.D. 158, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (small number of opt-outs "militates strongly" in favor
of approval); In re Residential Doors Antitrust Litig., No. 94-CV-3744, 1996 WL 751550, at *19-
20 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 1996) (small number of opt-outs was the "most significant factor"
counseling in favor of approval); Strougo ex rel. Brazilian Equity Fund, Inc. v. Bassini, 258 F.
Supp. 2d 254, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (lack of objection interpreted as overwhelming endorsement of
the settlement).
84. The Third Circuit has voiced skepticism about the value of statistics on the number of
opt-outs or objectors as indicating class-wide approval of the settlement. In re Gen. Motors Corp.
Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 812 (3d Cir. 1995). However, courts
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To the extent that dissent levels are relevant, our study
provides a baseline for assessing when the "reaction of the class"--
either opt-outs or objections-is positive or negative. Heretofore,
courts have had virtually no basis for comparison and thus had to
examine the rate of class reaction only in a particular case. Not
surprisingly, it has been common for courts to conclude that the
minimal number of opt-outs and objections counsels in favor of
approval of the settlement. However, because virtually all cases
display a minimal number of opt-outs and objections, the lack of
substantial dissent in a given case does not necessarily suggest that
the settlement is fair to the class. The law reports teem with opinions
in which the court concluded that a low level of dissent counseled in
favor of approval--even though the level of dissent was sometimes
higher than the average for cases in our study.
5
E. Mandatory vs. Opt-Out Actions
Our data also suggest a novel perspective on the distinction
between mandatory class actions under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) and
opt-out class actions under Rule 23(b)(3). Counsel frequently attempt
to shoe-horn claims for monetary relief into a mandatory class action
procedure.8 6 From counsel's perspective, this approach has the virtue
of conserving the costs of notice associated with the opt-out right and
also avoiding the hurdles of the predominance and superiority
requirements under Rule 23(b)(3). One of the major concerns about
such a strategy is that class members lose the right to opt-out of the
action. Some courts have suggested that the loss of opt-out rights for
money damages claims would deprive absent class members of due
process.8 7 Our study finds, however, that across the range of cases,
opt-out rights are not highly valued by class members. The data
suggest that at least in large-scale, small-claim actions, the decision to
structure a case as a mandatory rather than an opt-out class would
not significantly harm class members. The concerns about mandatory
continue to treat data on dissent rates as significant, even when reciting this admonishment.
See, e.g., In re Corel Corp. Inc. Sec. Litig., 293 F. Supp. 2d 484, 490 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
85. An example is Stoetzner v. U.S. Steel Corp., 897 F.2d 115, 118-19 (3d Cir. 1990), where
the court viewed 29 objections out of 281 class members as a factor that "strongly favors [the]
settlement." See also, e.g., Grove v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 200 F.R.D. 434, 447 (S.D. Iowa
2001) (characterizing as a "low" number of opt-outs a rate of 5,406 out of 400,000); In re Texas
Prison Litig., 191 F.R.D. 164, 175 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (characterizing 8 percent rate of objection as
"relatively low" and an indication of settlement's fairness).
86. The leading case is Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 411 (5th Cir. 1998)
(allowing some monetary claims to be brought under Rule 23(b)(2) but rejecting others).
87. See supra note 13. *
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class actions do have greater significance, however, in mass tort cases
where class members tend to opt-out at a higher rate than in other
types of class actions.
V. CONCLUSION
Our study finds, consistent with prior research into more
restricted data sets, that opt-out and objection rates in class actions
generally are trivially small percentages of the class. Dissent rates
decrease as the number of class members increases and increase as
the per capita class recovery increases. Dissent is most common in
mass tort and civil rights cases, with opt-outs being the principal
means of dissent in mass tort cases and objections taking the lead in
civil rights cases. Dissent is much less common in consumer and
securities cases. Across the range of cases, dissent rates-both opt-
outs and objections-have also been decreasing over time, for reasons
that are not clear from our data.
Opt-outs and objections have no statistically significant
relationship with attorney fees, either in absolute terms or as a
percentage of the recovery. Turning to the pattern of class approval,
we find that objection rates are higher for unapproved settlements
than for approved ones-suggesting that courts may give weight to
objections when evaluating class settlements or that the objections
reflect weaknesses in the settlement that are also independently
identified by the courts. Contrary to expectations, however, the mean
percentage of opt-outs was more than twice as large in approved
settlements as in disapproved ones.
Our data on dissent rates raise questions about several
important features of contemporary class action doctrine and practice:
personal jurisdiction, notice, adequacy of counsel, mandatory vs. opt-
out classes, and judicial evaluation of the fairness, adequacy, and
reasonableness of settlements. We provide baseline data that courts
can use in evaluating whether the reaction of the class to a proposed
settlement counsels in favor of approval. Overall, we have attempted
to enhance the information available to courts and litigators with
respect to an important aspect of class action practice.
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Appendix. Opt-out and Objection Rates by Year
Year Mean Opt-out %Median Opt-out %N
1993 0.1 0.1 4
1994 1.9 0.1 11
1995 0.7 0.1 9
1996 0.7 0.1 8
1997 0.5 0.1 14
1998 0.5 0.2 9
1999 0.3 0.3 8
2000 0.4 0.0 20
2001 0.8 0.1 25
2002 0.3 0.1 22
2003 0.6 0.0 13
Total 0.6 0.1 143
Year Mean Objector % Median
1993 1.7 0.0
1994 0.5 0.1
1995 3.3 0.0
1996 1.4 0.0
1997 2.9 0.0
1998 0.0 0.0
1999 1.2 0.0
2000 0.7 0.0
2001 0.1 0.0
2002 0.7 0.0
2003 0.0 0.0
Total 1.1 0.0
Obiector %N
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